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The Constitutional Requirements for
Special Elections
I. Introduction
United States Senator John Heinz from Pennsylvania was killed
in an airplane accident on April 4, 1991.1 The Governor of Pennsyl-
vania, Robert Casey, in accordance with Pennsylvania law,' issued a
writ for a special election3 to be held November 5, 1991. On May 8,
1991, Governor Casey appointed Harris Wofford as an interim Sena-
1. John H. Cushman, Jr., Senator Heinz and 6 Others Killed in Midair Crash Near
Philadelphia, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1991, at Al.
2. Pennsylvania law provides that:
When a vacancy shall occur in the office of United States Senator, said vacancy
shall be filled for the unexpired term by the vote of the electors of the State at a
special election to be held at the time of the next general or municipal election,
occurring at least ninety (90) days after the happening of the such vacancy,...
Candidates to fill vacancies in the office of United States Senator shall be nomi-
nated by political parties, in accordance with the party rules relating to the fill-
ing of vacancies.
25 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2776 (1991).
The Rules of the Democratic Party of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania provide:
Any vacancy happening or existing in the Democratic nomination for any office
to be voted for by the electors of the State at-large by reason of the death or
withdrawal of a candidate, failure to nominate at the Primary Election, the call-
ing of a special election, or other cause, and which cannot be filled at a Primary
Election under the law, shall be filled by the State Committee which shall have
authority to make and certify a nomination.
RULES OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Rule VIII, §
1 (Rev. 1990).
The Rules of the Republican Party of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania provide that:
If a vacancy for any cause shall occur in an elective public office which is voted
for by the electors of the state at large, and the Pennsylvania Election Code
provides that nominations by political parties are to be made in accordance with
party rules, nomination to fill said vacancy shall be made in the same manner as
provided for by rule 10.1 to fill vacancies on the Republican ticket.
RULES OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Rule 10.5
(1991).
Rule 10.1 provides that:
In the event of a vacancy occurring . . . the vacancy shall be filled by the State
Committee which shall have ful (sic) authority to make and certify said nomina-
tion, provided that in the event of a vacancy occurring less that three weeks
before the last day to file a substitute nomination, the Leadership Committee
shall have full authority to make and certify nomination.
RULES OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Rule 10.1
(1991) [hereinafter RULES OF THE DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN PARTIES OF
PENNSYLVANIA].
3. Special election is defined as "[A]n election for a particular emergency conducted
...to fill a vacancy arising by death of the incumbent of the office." BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 518 (6th ed. 1990). For purposes of this Comment, "special election" will also include a
vacancy caused by the resignation of an incumbent.
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tor to fill the vacant senatorial seat until the special election.' Sena-
tor Wofford, elected on November 5, 1991 by the people of Pennsyl-
vania, will serve the remainder of Heinz's term which expires
January 1, 1995.
The electoral process was brought to an abrupt halt when John
S. Trinsey Jr. filed suit against the Pennsylvania Board of Elections
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania.' Trinsey alleged that the Pennsylvania election statute vio-
lated the Seventeenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion.' The District Court granted Trinsey's request for a declaratory
judgment and held that the statute illegally permitted political par-
ties to nominate candidates by means other than special election. As
such, the court determined that the statute was inconsistent with the
Seventeenth Amendment's requirement that a senatorial seat be fil-
led by a popular election. 7 On appeal the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and held that the Pennsylva-
nia state legislature may exercise reasonable discretion in determin-
ing the method in which vacant Senate seats should be filled.8
This Comment examines the question of whether the Seven-
teenth Amendment requires that a state hold primary elections to fill
a vacant seat in the United States Senate. First, the Comment exam-
ines the legislative history of the original sections of the Constitution
pertaining to the election of Senators. Second, the Comment dis-
cusses the changes mandated by the Seventeenth Amendment.
Third, the Comment analyzes five United States Supreme Court de-
cisions relating to primary elections. Finally, the Comment proposes
a suggested analysis of special elections.
4. Michael deCourcy Hinds, Governor Names Heinz Successor, N.Y. TIMES, May 9,
1991, at A16.
5. Trinsey v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 766 F. Supp. 1338 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
6. The Seventeenth Amendment provides that:
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each
State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have
one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for
electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the
executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such vacan-
cies: Provided, That the legislatures of any State may empower the executive
thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by
election as the legislature may direct.
U.S. CON ST. amend. XVII.
7. Trinsey, 766 F. Supp. at 1337. Popular election is defined as an "[e]lection by the
people as a whole, rather than by a select group." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 518 (6th ed.
1990).
8. Trinsey v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 941 F.2d 224 (3d Cir. 1991).
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II. Senate Elections 1787-1913
A. Debate on the Method of Regular Elections
Senators were elected by state legislatures until the Seventeenth
Amendment was ratified in 1913. Two plans, one authored by
Charles Pinckney and the other by Edmund Randolph, were
presented for consideration by the delegates at the outset of the Con-
stitutional Convention.9 Surprisingly, neither of the plans provided
that Senators be popularly elected. The delegates held widely differ-
ing views regarding the proper structure of a legislative body. Sev-
eral members of the Convention expressed the opinion that the com-
mon people could not be trusted to vote for wise government policy."
Other delegates had more confidence in the people. They argued that
the House of Representatives should be elected by the people and the
Senate by the state legislatures." Only one member of the Conven-
tion, James Wilson, anticipated passage of the Seventeenth Amend-
ment. He argued that both branches of the national legislature
should be elected by the people.12
Delegates supporting the proposition that the selection of Sena-
tors should be made by the state legislatures made four arguments to
support their position.'" Those delegates who did not fully trust the
wisdom of the people put forth the first argument. They wanted a
small Senate' 4 made up of wise and deliberate men.' 5 They thought
9. Edmund Randolph's plan, also known as the Virginia Plan, in Resolution 5, provided
that "[tlhe members of the second branch of the National Legislature ought to be elected by
those of the first, out of a proper number of persons nominated by the individual Legislatures."
I JAMES MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 61 (E.H. Scott ed., Scott,
Foresman and Co. 1898) (1840) [hereinafter MADISON].
Charles Pinckney's plan, also known as the South Carolina Plan, in Article IV, provided
that "[tihe Senate shall be elected and chosen by the House of Delegates; . . . and they shall
fill all vacancies that arise from death or resignation, for the time of service remaining of the
members so dying or resigning." Id. at 65-66.
10. Roger Sherman said that "[tlhe people . . . should have as little to do as may be
about the government. They want information, and are constantly liable to be misled." Id. at
78. Elbridge Gerry thought that "[t]he evils we experience flow from the excess of democracy.
The people do not want virtue, but are the dupes of pretended patriots." Id.
11. James Madison and George Mason both thought that one branch should be elected
by the people. Id. at 78, 79.
12. MADISON, supra note 9, at 82. Wilson anticipated ratification of the Seventeenth
Amendment by 126 years, (1787-1913).
13. 1 GEORGE HAYNES, THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 13 (1938) [hereinafter
HAYNES].
14. Edmund Randolph favored a small Senate so that it would be free from "the pas-
sionate proceedings to which numerous assemblies are liable." MADISON supra note 9, at 81.
Hugh Williamson thought that twenty five senators would be adequate. MADISON, supra note
9, at 125. James Madison also favored a small Senate. He thought that a larger legislative
body would be less capable of fulfilling its mission. MADISON, supra note 9, at 126.
15. John Dickinson wanted distinguished and wealthy men to serve in the Senate. His
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that this type of man would be best chosen by state legislatures."8
The second argument was that the states, as states, should be repre-
sented in the Senate.' 7 Next, some delegates thought that the differ-
ent methods of election would produce an internal check in Con-
gress.18 Theoretically, the tempestuous debate in the House would be
tempered by the reflective and wise men in the Senate. Conversely,
the conservative Senate would be forced into action by a House that
was eager to act on an issue. The last argument posited was that the
state legislatures would be much more willing to ratify the Constitu-
tion if they had a voice in the national government. 19
B. Debate of the Original Vacancy Provision
While the methods of electing Senators were hotly debated, the
vacancy provision was barely mentioned. The only debate over the
provision occurred in the Convention after the first draft of the Con-
stitution was presented to the Committee of the Whole. The first
draft provided that "[v]acancies may be supplied by the Executive
[state governor] until the next meeting of the legislature."2
Debate regarding the vacancy provision took place on August 9,
1787.21 James Wilson thought it was unnecessary to have the Execu-
tive appoint a Senator because the vacancy would be left open for
less than a year.22 He also thought that the Executive should not
have the power to appoint a Senator since the Executive in most
states was elected by the state legislature. Wilson felt an appointed
Senator would be too far removed from the people. 3 Edmund Ran-
model was the British House of Lords. Contrary to Edmund Randolph and Hugh Williamson,
he wanted a large Senate so that it could serve as a check on the House of Representatives.
MADISON, supra note 9, at 124-25.
16. Elbridge Gerry thought that the legislatures had more character than the people.
MADISON, supra note 9, at 129. John Dickinson thought that the legislature was more likely to
pick wise and distinguished men than the people. MADISON, supra note 9, at 125.
17. George Mason wished to make the states "a constituent part of the national estab-
lishment". MADISON, supra note 9, at 130.
18. Hugh Williamson opined that different methods of representation would serve as a
mutual check on each branch of the national legislature. MADISON, supra note 9, at 125.
James Madison predicted the Senate's debates would proceed with "more coolness, with more
system, and with more wisdom, than the popular branch." MADISON, supra note 9, at 126.
19. Roger Sherman thought that the states would support a national government if the
states had a voice in the national legislature. The states and the national government would
have a mutual interest in each other's existence. MADISON, supra note 9, at 124.
20. MADISON, supra note 9, at 451.
21. MADISON, supra note 9, at 482.
22. At the time of the Constitutional Convention, the state legislatures met at least once
a year. Thus the vacancy would not last for more than a year. Valenti v. Rockefeller, 292 F.
Supp. 851, 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), affid, 393 U.S. 405 (1969).
23. MADISON, supra note 9, at 482. Wilson did not like the practice of the state legisla-
tures appointing the governor either. MADISON, supra note 9, at 482.
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dolph, on the other hand, thought that a vacancy was quite impor-
tant and should be filled as soon as possible. The Senate was too
small and too powerful to leave vacant seats unfilled.24 James
Madison proposed that the state legislature be permitted to fill the
vacancy with the provision that if the legislature was in recess, the
Executive could fill a vacancy until the next meeting of the legisla-
ture.25 Madison's motion was adopted by the Convention. 6
III. Support for Primary Elections and the Seventeenth Amendment
A. State Support for Primary Elections
By 1911, the number of problems resulting from state legisla-
tures electing Senators reached a breaking point. The problems in-
cluded corruption,27 deadlocks,28 delays in conducting state business
by the legislatures,2" and the existence of unfilled vacancies in the
Senate.3" The people, as well as the state legislators themselves, grew
increasingly disenchanted with the electoral process and demanded
reform. 1
The people of Oregon blazed the trail of reform for other states
24. MADISON, supra note 9, at 482.
25. MADISON, supra note 9, at 483.
26. MADISON, supra note 9.
27. Nine cases of allegedly tainted senatorial elections were brought before the Senate
between 1866 and 1911. HAYNES, supra note 13, at 91.
28. A newspaper description of a deadlocked Missouri state legislature is worth quoting
in full.
Lest the hour of adjournment should come before an election was secured, an
attempt was made to stop the clock upon the wall of the assembly chamber.
Democrats tried to prevent its being tampered with; and when certain Republi-
cans brought forward a ladder, it was seized and thrown out of the window. A
fist-fight followed, in which many were involved. Desks were torn from the floor
and a fusillade of books began. The glass of the clock front was broken, but the
pendulum still persisted in swinging until, in the midst of a yelling mob, one
member began throwing ink bottles at the clock, and finally succeeded in break-
ing the pendulum. On a motion to adjourn, arose the wildest disorder. The pre-
siding officers of both houses mounted the speaker's desk, and, by shouting and
waving their arms, tried to quiet the mob. Finally, they succeeded in securing
some semblance of order.
HAYNES, supra note 13, at 90.
29. In 1895, the Delaware legislature tried for 114 days to elect a senator and still
failed. I ROBERT BYRD, THE SENATE 1789-1989 393 (1988). Several states were forced to call
special sessions of the legislatures for the sole purpose of electing a senator. S. REP. No. 961,
61st Cong., 3d Sess. 13, 14 (1911).
30. From 1866 through 1911, six states let their representation in the Senate lapse
rather than go to the trouble of electing a senator. HAYNES, supra note 13, at 95.
3 1. The Democratic, People's, and Populist parties all included planks in their platforms
favoring popular election of senators. The movement in the state legislatures towards popular
election was strongest in the South and the West. By 1905, a total of thirty-one states had
petitioned Congress to amend the Constitution. HAYNES, supra note 13, at 97-98.
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to follow by launching an initiative petition known as a "direct pri-
mary nominating elections law".32 The voters approved the proposed
law by a three to one majority in the general election held in June of
1904. a The law provided that candidates for the Oregon state legis-
lature be permitted to include a signed statement printed on the bal-
lot informing the voter whether the candidate supported popular
elections of senators. 4 This pledge was an attempt to make state
legislators vote for the senatorial candidate who received the most
votes in the unofficial primaries. Five years later, the Oregon Republ
lican legislators fulfilled their pledges by casting their ballots for the
victor in the primary, a Democrat.35 Public interest in the popular
election of senators was so intense that every state legislature ex-
amined the Oregon model of primary elections.36 The pace of change
was so rapid that by 1910, only six years after passage of the Oregon
law, fourteen of the thirty senators elected that year had been first
chosen in primary elections.37
B. Senatorial Support for Primary Elections
Many senators supported the concept of primary elections. Ne-
braska Senator Norris Brown said that "the direct primary for elec-
tive officers is the first step in the establishment and the most neces-
sary step in the preservation of real representative government. 38
Maryland Senator Isidor Rayner commented that "in a great many
of the States now Senators are nominated at primary elections, and I
believe the time will come when every State will adopt this sys-
tem."' 39 Mississippi Senator Le Roy Percy, referring to his home
state, remarked that "we have now, under the primary election sys-
tem which obtains there, the benefits which are sought to be con-
ferred by the joint resolution, having there a primary election by a
majority of the voters."40 Idaho Senator William Borah, who led the
32. HAYNES, supra note 13, at 101. The Wisconsin legislature, at the urging of Robert
M. La Follette, passed an open primary law in 1903. Democratic Party of United States v.
Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 127 (1980).
33. HAYNES, supra note 13, at 101,
34. Candidates had to choose whether to support Statement No. 1 or Statement No. 2.
If the candidate signed the first statement, he pledged himself to vote for the senatorial candi-
date who received the most votes in the general election. Statement No. 2 enabled the candi-
date to take the people's choice for senator as "nothing more than a recommendation."
HAYNES, supra note 13, at 101.
35. HAYNES, supra note 13, at 102-03.
36. HAYNES, supra note 13, at 103.
37. HAYNES, supra note 13, at 104.
38. 46 CONG. REC. 2493 (1911).
39. Id. at 1163.
40. Id. at 2128. Senator Le Roy Percy's statement makes one wonder if the Seventeenth
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fight in the Senate for popular elections, predicted that "[e]ach State
has it's [sic] primary or is coming to have."41
A number of Senators supported popular elections as a way to
counteract the power of the party bosses. Kansas Senator Joseph
Bristow cited the notorious corruption of state legislators as a com-
pelling argument for primaries.42 Indiana Senator Albert Beveridge
thought that the party bosses were even more powerful than the peo-
ple.4a Senator Rayner believed that the American people were ready
for representative government. He said, "I am opposed to both the
convention and caucus. I want to . . . put the power where it be-
longs, . . . in the people of the United States.""'
Some Senators felt that primary elections would not solve the
problems about which the people were complaining or that primaries
might create different problems. North Dakota Senator Porter Mc-
Cumber listed four disadvantages of primaries: (1) corruption would
spread due to the great amount of money needed to run for office,
(2) distortion about a candidate's record and character might be be-
lieved by a gullible public, (3) many honest and capable men would
refuse to run for office because of the viciousness of the press, and
(4) intra-party rivalry would tear apart the party system.45 New
York Senator Chauncey Depew was concerned that the Senate
would find it difficult to sit in judgment on the results of a popular
election. He was wary of the bribery and corruption that would inev-
itably take place among the general populace." 6 New York Senator
Elihu Root, like many of the founding fathers, was fearful that sta-
bility and the Senate's mature reflection would be irretrievably
Amendment was necessary. Senator Porter McCumber was of the opinion that the nomination
of Senators by popular vote would yield the same result as the election of Senators by popular
vote. 47 CONG. REC. 1879 (1911). Of course an amendment would apply to the nation as a
whole whereas each state would have to provide for popular nomination.
41. 47 CONG. REC. 1886 (1911).
42. Id. at 2179.
43. Id. at 2253.
44. Id. at 1164.
45. The first three of Senator Porter McCumber's disadvantages seem to have been real-
ized, as evidenced by the effects of political action committees, thirty second political advertis-
ing on television, and the Gary Hart episode in the 1984 Democratic presidential primary.
McCumber did not want to vote for the Seventeenth Amendment but ultimately did. He gave
two reasons. First, after many years of reflection, the people decided they wanted to change
the Constitution. Second, he was merely voting to send the proposed amendment to the States
for ratification. 47 CONG. REC. 1881, 1882 (1911).
46. Senator Chauncey Depew thought it was likely that the same men who bribed state
legislators would find it just as easy to corrupt ordinary citizens. 46 CONG. REC. 1337 (1911).
Senator Porter McCumber did not believe that any corrupt practice act could effectively deter
those who offered bribes. Instead of the state legislators taking large bribes, the common peo-
ple would take smaller bribes. Id. at 1881.
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lost.4 7
It is evident many Senators were favorably disposed towards the
idea of holding primary election before the general election. Some
even wished that every state would hold primaries. The question re-
mains, however, whether they intended, when approving the Seven-
teenth Amendment, to mandate that primary elections be used as
the exclusive method of selecting candidates to run in the general
election.
C. Debate in Congress on the Seventeenth Amendment
The debate on the Seventeenth Amendment in the House of
Representatives and the Senate sheds little light on the question of
whether primary elections are required to be used as the exclusive
method of selecting candidates to run in the general election. Even
the most ardent proponents of primary elections seemed to believe it
was the responsibility of each state to decide if primaries were the
proper mode to be used in the selection of worthy candidates.48 Most
of the statements made by the Congressmen regarding the future of
primary elections were, in essence, predictions of the outcome of the
existing trend toward primary elections in the States.
Part of the problem in resolving the question stems from the
fact that primary elections were not seen to be the most important
issue. Instead, the Senate spent most of its time debating the issue of
whether the Constitution should be amended to remove the power
reserved in Congress to regulate the conduct of federal elections in
the States.49 The Southern Democrats, afraid of the federal power
exercised during Reconstruction,"0 refused to vote for the Seven-
teenth Amendment unless the proposed Amendment contained a
clause vesting the exclusive control over the time, place, and manner
of holding elections in the States.5" The debates between the two
47. Senator Elihu Root also thought that many of the problems were caused by the
federal election statute of 1866. Id. at 2241-42. The statute required each house of the state
legislature to meet separately and take one ballot. The next day the legislature would meet and
canvass the result. If one man did not take a majority in each house, then the legislature had
to meet daily and take at least one vote per day until a senator was elected. HAYNES, supra
note 13, at 85.
48. Senator William Borah, the leading proponent of popular elections, hoped that the
state legislatures would obtain full power to regulate the election of senators and representa-
tives. 46 CONG. REc. 851 (1911).
49. A complete version of the struggle of the Southern states to gain control the election
process is contained in HAYNES, supra note 13, at 108-15.
50. Senator Joseph Johnston from Alabama feared that armed United States troops and
federal marshals would again be used "to intimidate the voters" as he alleged occurred during
Reconstruction. 47 CONG. REC. 1884 (1911).
51. A representative example of the resolution debated is found at 47 CONG. REC. 1884
SPECIAL ELECTIONS
factions in the Senate show that the text of the Amendment, provid-
ing for direct election by the people, was intended to give the people
a choice of candidates in a general election, not require a particular
method for selecting candidates to run in a general election.52
D. Does the Seventeenth Amendment Require Primary Elections?
The first argument for interpreting the Seventeenth Amendment
to mandate primary elections is that, in both general and special
elections, Senators are to be elected by the people.53 The argument's
emphasis is on the people's ability to exercise a meaningful choice at
the general election. The corruption of the state legislatures was one
of the primary concerns of the Senate. Senate Report No. 961, au-
thored by Senator William Borah for the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee,54 referred twice to the evil effects of corruption. Article VIII of
the report mentioned the numerous allegations of bribery that had
attached to senatorial elections.55 The report, in Article IX, com-
pared the different ways in which governors and senators were
elected. It admired the relative purity of popular elections of state
governors.56 Representative Tucker, in Section I of House Report
No. 36851 on the election of federal officers, expressed concern that
corruption was destroying the pure administration of the govern-
ment.58 The argument has some merit. The Senate was very con-
(1911). (The Southern states wanted "[the times, places, and manner of holding elections for
Senators ...[to] be ...prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof.")
52. In Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921), the issue was whether Con-
gress, through its power to regulate the manner of election, could regulate state primary elec-
tion practices. Four Justices answered in the affirmative and four answered in the negative.
Justice MacReynolds, writing the plurality opinion, stated that the Seventeenth Amendment
did not announce or require a new meaning of the word "'election." Since primaries were
unknown in 1787, the concept of elections in the Constitution did not encompass primary elec-
tions. Certainly if primary elections had been required under the Amendment, the Court
would have found that Congress had the power to regulate them. It was not until United
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), reh'g denied 314 U.S. 707 (1941) that the Court held
that, under certain narrowly defined circumstances, Congress had the power to regulate pri-
mary elections.
53. The Seventeenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part:
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each
State, elected by the people thereof . . . .That the legislatures of any State
may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the
people fill the vacancies." [emphasis supplied]. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
54. S. REP. No. 961, 61st Cong., 3d Sess. 13 (1911).
55. Charges of bribery arose from senatorial elections and tainted the entire state legis-
lature. Id. at 13.
56. Id. at 14.
57. H.R. REP. No. 368, 52nd Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1892).
58. "The corporation that can enter the halls of a legislature and lay its unholy hand
upon the members, claiming them as its own ... has already destroyed the hope of a pure
administration of the local affairs of the people of that State." Id. at 4.
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cerned about the corruption that seemed inherent in legislative elec-
tions. The Senate could have seen primary elections as an ideal
method to deal with the problem.
However, reliance on the argument that the Senate intended to
require primaries to banish corruption from general elections is ill-
advised. Representative Tucker's report was submitted in 1892.
Binding primary elections for the selection of Senators were un-
known until Oregon devised the idea in 1904. In addition, Tucker
thought that if popular general elections were held the nominating
conventions would be free from corruption since the "corruptionist
will not dare to face the scorn of an enlightened constituency." 59
Thus Tucker, in actuality, presupposed the existence of nominating
conventions and failed to address the idea of primaries at all. Reli-
ance on Senator Borah's report for support is equally unavailing.
Nowhere in the report are primary elections even mentioned.
The second argument is that primaries were seen as a method to
strike a blow at the power of the party bosses. The Wisconsin Su-
preme Court stated that the great reformer, Robert M. La Follette,
Sr., supported the primary because he believed that "citizens should
nominate the party candidates; that the citizens, not the party
bosses, could control the party by controlling the candidate selection
process." 60 Senator Rayner was opposed to the caucus and the nomi-
nating convention partly because both were dominated by party
bosses.6 ' The populace as a whole considered political parties to be
unresponsive and not representative of the constituency of the
parties.
6 2
A counterargument is that the power of the party bosses has, to
a certain extent, been broken by reforms of the election laws. It is no
longer possible for one person to exercise complete dominion over the
internal workings of a political party. Another difference between
the early 1900's and the present is that, in most states, primary elec-
59. Id. at 5.
60. Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S.
107, 127 (1980).
61. 46 CONG. REC. 1164 (1911).
62. ALAN GRIMES, DEMOCRACY AND THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION 74, 75
(1978). A more current example of this problem was typified by the New York election laws
prior to 1967. Before 1967, candidates for statewide offices were nominated at the party con-
vention. The people's only participation in the selection process was in voting for delegates to
the conventions. Much debate ensued over whether this practice resulted in party bosses exer-
cising too much influence in the selection of nominees. In 1967, the practice was changed to
enable candidates who found substantial support at the convention, but did not receive the
nomination to run against the party's nominee. Valenti v. Rockefeller, 292 F. Supp. 851, 861
(S.D.N.Y 1968), afj-d, 393 U.S. 405 (1969).
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tions are the norm rather than the exception.6" In most cases, voters
are able to cast a ballot in a primary election. Only in relatively rare
cases, such as a special election, will a person be denied the chance
to vote in a primary.
E. Conclusion
It is evident from the Congressional debates and reports that
primary elections, while viewed favorably as a way to rid party polit-
ics of corruption and boss rule, were not mandated for either general
or special elections. Although the framers of the Seventeenth
Amendment did not intend to require primary elections before a gen-
eral election could occur, it is still necessary to examine United
States Supreme Court decisions to determine whether any other pro-
vision of the Constitution requires primary elections.
IV. Supreme Court Analysis of the Nature of Primary Elections
A. United States v. Classic
One of the most important Supreme Court cases used by the
District Court in Trinsey to establish a right to vote in a primary
election was United States v. Classic.64 In Classic, the Louisiana
legislature had required that political parties use primary elections to
nominate candidates for the office of U.S. Representative.6 5 The ap-
pellees in Classic were two Commissioners of Elections in Louisiana.
They were indicted for the alleged alteration of ballots in the Demo-
cratic primary election for United States Representative. The situa-
tion in Louisiana was such that the Democratic nominee elected in
the district primary would always win the general election.66
In Classic, the U.S. Supreme Court began its analysis by recog-
nizing that Article I, Section 2, clause 1, and Article I, Section 4,
clause 1 of the Constitution grants wide discretion to the state legis-
latures to regulate elections of United States officers.67 The Court
63. See, e.g., 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2862 (1991).
64. 313 U.S. 299 (1941), rehg denied 314 U.S. 707 (1941).
65. Id. at 311.
66. The Commissioners argued that they were merely officers of a political party. They
also argued the proposition that a primary election is only an internal party function. The
corollary to this proposition is that even though the State may regulate primary elections, that,
in and of itself, is not sufficient to make a primary election constitute state action. Id. at 304.
67. Article I, Section 2, Clause I of the U.S. Constitution provides that "It]he Electors
[of the House of Representatives] shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the
most numerous Branch of the State Legislature." Thus the state legislatures can deny the
ballot to potential electors as it sees fit. The Seventeenth Amendment contains the same lan-
guage as Article 1, Section 2, Clause I thereby making senatorial elections subject to the
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also recognized that the primary essentially determines the candi-
dates who appear on the ballot in the general election. 8 The Court
placed special emphasis on the fact that the Democratic nominee
was the successful candidate in the general election for the past forty
years. Thus, the Commissioners had interfered with the choice of the
voters at the only stage of the election where the interference would
be effective.6 9 The Court then stated that "[t]he right of qualified
voters to vote at the Congressional primary in Louisiana and to have
their ballots counted is thus the right to participate in that choice.
We come then to the question of whether that right is one secured
by the Constitution."7
The Court opined that the framers of the Constitution regarded
the right to a free choice of candidates as a fundamental right of the
American people. 1 Breaking down the election process into two dis-
crete steps, the primary and the popular elections, could not serve to
denigrate the fundamental right of the people to have a meaningful
vote.72 The Court held that "[w]here the state law has made the
primary an integral part of the procedure of choice, or where in fact
the primary effectively controls the choice, the right of the elector to
have his ballot counted at the primary is likewise included in the
right protected by Article I, § 2. '7
In Trinsey, the District Court applied the first prong of the
control of the legislatures. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
Article I, Section 4, Clause I of the U.S. Constitution provides that "[tihe Times, Places,
and Manner of holding Election for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each
State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations."
68. Classic, 313 U.S. at 311.
69. Id. at 314.
70. Id.
71. The right to choose or, in other words, the right to elect is not an enumerated right
in the Constitution. The state legislatures may modify who "the people" are that may vote.
However, the fact that Article 1, Section 2, Clause I of the Constitution provides that Repre-
sentatives shall be chosen by the people presupposes that at least some people will be author-
ized by appropriate state legislation to cast ballots. Thus those who are enabled by state law to
vote have the right to vote. Classic, 313 U.S. at 318; Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 664
(1884). Since the Constitutional command is unlimited, neither states nor individuals may
deny an eligible voter the right to choose. Classic, 313 U.S. at 315.
Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884) is the case that established the right to freely
elect federal officers. Yarbrough and seven other men were sentenced to prison for attempting
to prevent a black man from voting in a Congressional election. Id. at 656. The Court held
that Congress had the power to criminalize conduct which prevented citizens from freely
choosing whether to vote and for whom to vote. The Court reasoned that it is in the federal
government's interest to have free elections since the government's power is derived from the
people. Id. at 662.
72. The Court rejected the argument that because primary elections were unknown
when the Constitution was adopted, the right to choose should be limited solely to the general
election. Classic, 313 U.S. at 316.
73. Id. at 318.
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Classic test and held that since Pennsylvania law requires a primary
election to nominate candidates for a general election, Pennsylvania
must also hold a primary election before a special election.7
Classic's holding, as applied to the Trinsey facts, however, is
inapposite for two reasons. First, the facts of Classic limit the hold-
ing to one party states.7 5 The Democrats had a forty year record of
successful candidates. This fact transformed the Democratic primary
into the equivalent of a general election. The general election was, in
reality, a rubberstamp approval by the voters of the Democratic pri-
mary result. Second, the two types of elections are distinguishable.
Classic was concerned with a general election. In Trinsey, the con-
stitutional requirements for special elections are at issue. The cir-
cumstances under which special elections are declared differentiate
them from general elections for purposes of constitutional analysis.
Thus, Classic holds that if a state chooses to mandate primaries for
the general election then the primary elections must comply with
constitutional strictures. Classic's holding does not apply to or even
mention special elections.
B. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut
The other case relied upon by the District Court in Trinsey was
Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut.76 Tashjian, a freedom
of association case, was a 5-4 decision. Connecticut law required that
voters participating in a party primary had to be members of that
party.77 The Republican Party adopted a party rule permitting inde-
74. The fundamental error of the District Court is contained in the statement that
"Pennsylvania ... has chosen to have the major parties make nomination prior to the general
election. Because the choice of party nominees plays a central role in determining the eventual
electoral outcome, the question of whether those nominees must be chosen democratically is a
valid one." Trinsey v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 766 F.Supp. 1338 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
75. Other cases providing protection for the right to vote at the primary stage of the
electoral process are also distinguishable due to the one party nature of the election. Nader v.
Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837, 843 (D.Conn. 1976) (Classic was not binding since Connecticut
was not a one party state), affd mere. 429 U.S. 989 (1976). The "White Primary" cases are
both Equal Protection Clause cases. In Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927), the state itself
limited participation in primaries to white citizens. Id. at 540. In Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S.
73 (1932), the Texas legislature delegated authority to regulate the qualifications of voters
necessary to participate in primary elections to the Democratic Party. In both cases, regulation
of primary elections was held to be state action. Herndon, 273 U.S. at 541; Condon, 286 U.S.
at 88-89. The Court then applied the suspect classification test and held that the rules exclud-
ing blacks from participation in party primaries were invalid. See Julia E. Guttman, Note,
Primary Elections and the Collective Right of Freedom of Association, 94 YALE L.J. 117,
118, n.9 (1984) (collecting and discussing the "White Primary" cases).
76. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
77. Justice Scalia, in his dissent, points out that the burden on the Republican Party's
freedom of association is quite minimal. Independents were allowed to join the Party up until
the day before the primary. Id. at 235 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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pendent voters to vote in the Republican primary. Because approxi-
mately one-third of registered Connecticut voters were independents,
the Republican Party hoped that enabling independents to take part
in the primary selection process would produce a candidate that ap-
pealed to independent voters in the general election.7" The Republi-
can Party then asked for a declaratory judgment that the Connecti-
cut statute violated the Party's First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights to free association."
The United States Supreme Court began its analysis with the
proposition that "[a]ny interference with the freedom of a party is
simultaneously an interference with the freedom of its adherents."80
The Republican Party argued that the Connecticut statute unconsti-
tutionally interfered with the Party's ability to associate with inde-
pendent voters. The State asserted that it had the power to regulate
the "[t]imes, [p]laces and [m]anner of holding [e]lections for Sena-
tors and Representatives." 81 The Court rejected the State's attempt
to argue, what in effect was, a rational basis test. Instead, the Court
held that "[t]he power to regulate . . . elections does not justify...
the abridgment of fundamental rights such as the right to vote." 2
After imposing a strict scrutiny test the Court found that the State's
purported interests were insubstantial.8 "
78. The record showed that there were 659,268 registered Democrats, 425,695 regis-
tered Republicans and 532,723 independent voters. Id. at 212, n.3. The Republican Party
would have to attract a substantial number of independent voters to prevail in a general elec-
tion. Thus the Party was very interested in selecting a candidate who appealed to both Repub-
licans and independents.
79. Id. at 213. The District Court granted summary judgment for the Republican Party
and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 213.
80. Id. at 215.
81. Id. at 217. The State attempted to encompass its regulation of primary elections
within the U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 4, Clause 1.
82. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208 (1986). It is not clear
where the boundary is drawn between a party's right to freedom of association and a State's
right to regulate its elections. Tashjian was a 5-4 decision. The dissent did not believe that the
Republican Party's freedom of association was infringed in any significant way. Id. at 234-37.
See generally Martin G. Byrne, Political Parties Win the Battle. Will They Win the War?:
Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, How. L.J. 83 (1989) (discussing whether politi-
cal party activities constitute state action.); Julia E. Guttman, Note, Primary Elections and
the Collective Right of Freedom of Association, 94 YALE L.J. 117 (1984) (discussing ramifi-
cations that Tashjian will have upon the relationship between states and political parties).
83. Connecticut asserted several interests. The first interest was ensuring the adminis-
trability of the system. Additional workers and voting machines would be needed. The State
did not want to bear the additional costs that the party rule would create. Tashjian, 479 U.S.
at 217-18. Second, the State wanted to prevent raiding. Raiding occurs when Democrats vote
in the Republican primary, or vice versa, hoping to influence the outcome of the primary. Id.
at 219. The Court noted that the existence of raiding had never been conclusively proven. Id.
at 219, n.9. Third, the State argued that the system avoided voter confusion over where candi-
dates stood on issues. Id. at 220. The Court rejected that argument out of hand. It said that
,our cases reflect a greater faith in the ability of individual voter to inform themselves about
SPECIAL ELECTIONS
One of the State's concerns was that administrative costs would
be much greater if the Republican Party implemented its rule al-
lowing independents to vote in its primary. The Court dismissed that
concern saying that if a major third party emerged the State would
have to pay for a third primary. 4 The Court, however, in dicta, rec-
ognized that "the State is . . . entitled to take administrative and
financial considerations into account in choosing whether or not to
have a primary system at all." 5
According to the Court, the State has the power to abolish the
primary and institute a different method of candidate selection. Pre-
sumably, the State could enable the political parties to establish
their own election procedures so long as the party rules did not vio-
late any other constitutional provision."6 This is exactly the course
that Pennsylvania has chosen regarding nominations for special elec-
tions.8 7 In the event of a special election, the political parties in
Pennsylvania could properly choose to nominate by state committee,
nominating convention or even primary. Due to the exigent circum-
stances of a special election both political parties have chosen to
nominate by state committee.88
Paradoxically, the district court's decision in Trinsey violates
the spirit of Tashjian. By requiring a primary election to be held,
the court reduces a political party's freedom to select candidates in
the manner that it chooses. A party's self interest dictates that a
candidate likely to attract voters must be selected. Naturally, the
party will choose a candidate acceptable to a majority of the party's
members.
Neither Classic nor Tashjian support the Trinsey court's deci-
sion that the Pennsylvania election statute infringes on the right to
vote.89 Classic is easily distinguishable from Trinsey on the facts.
The Tashjian decision with its recognition of both state and party
power to regulate elections renders implication of a constitutional re-
campaign issues." Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 220. Lastly, the State contended that the Party rule
would lead to a fracturing of the two party system. Id. at 223. The Court dismissed this
argument admitting that while the State has a legitimate interest in protecting the political
parties from external threats, in the instant case it is the party itself allowing independents to
vote in the party primary. Id. at 224.
84. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208, 218 (1986).
85. Id.
86. There are several restrictions on the state's power to regulate elections. U.S. CONST.
amend. XV (bans discrimination based on race). U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (bans discrimina-
tion based on sex). U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (lowered voting age to eighteen).
87. 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2776 (Supp. 1992).
88. RULES OF THE DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN PARTIES OF PENNSYLVANIA, supra
note 2.
89. See supra notes 64-88 and accompanying text.
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quirement of primary elections quite difficult. To complete the analy-
sis of the problem, however, decisions affecting special elections must
be examined.
IV. Special Elections
The U.S. Supreme Court has infrequently addressed the Consti-
tutional requirements of special elections. It has, though, on occa-
sion, decided disputes arising out of unusual election occurrences.
These decisions are useful because they define what types of argu-
ments the Court finds persuasive in a case not involving a general
election.
A. Fortson v. Morris
The Supreme Court in Fortson v. Morris90 analyzed a provision
of the Georgia State Constitution. The provision provided that where
no candidate for governor received a majority of votes in the regular
election, the Georgia legislature would elect a governor from the two
candidates who received the highest number of votes. 9' In the No-
vember 6, 1966 general election, a third gubernatorial candidate pre-
vented either of the top two candidates from receiving an absolute
majority of the votes cast in the election.
92
The Court held that the legislative election did not deny voters
their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.9" Furthermore, the Court stated "[t]here is no provi-
sion of the United States Constitution or any of its amendments
which either expressly or impliedly dictates the method a State must
use to select its Governor."9 The majority, applying a rational basis
90. 385 U.S. 231 (1966).
91. Id. at 232, n.1. While this electoral method does not fit squarely within the definition
of a special election, it can be analogized to a situation where the governorship is vacant and
must be filled by a special election. The state legislature then would have the prerogative to
decide the besi manner in which to fill the vacancy.
92. Id. at 236. Callaway received 47.07%, Maddox received 46.88% and Arnall re-
ceived 6.05% of the votes cast in the election. Id. Thus, the Georgia legislature would choose
between Callaway and Maddox.
93. Fortson, 385 U.S. at 233. Significantly, the Court rejected application of the one
person, one vote standard found in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963). The Fortson Court
characterized Gray as "only a voting case." Nothing in Gray could be construed to prevent a
legislative election. Fortson, 385 U.S. at 233. The dissent, however, thought that the legislative
election would violate the Gray standard. Each legislator had only one vote for the district he
or she represented. When the vote was cast for one candidate then all the votes from that
district for the opposing candidates in the popular election would be ignored. Thus the legisla-
tive election had the same problems that the county-unit system did in Gray. Id. at 240 (Doug-
las, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 234.
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test, found that the Georgia legislature had numerous rational rea-
sons for its decision that a legislative election, under the circum-
stances, would speed the selection of a governor.9 5 The Court stated
four reasons why the Georgia legislature could legitimately elect a
Governor. First, Georgia had already held two primaries and one
general election. The Court refused to require Georgia to hold an-
other election that would probably not result in a majority vote for
one candidate.9 Second, the Court took into account the fact that a
statewide election costs a great deal of money.9" Third, legislative
elections had precedent in Georgia history.98 Fourth, two other states
required legislatures to elect a candidate where no candidate re-
ceived a majority. 99
B. Valenti v. Rockefeller
In Fortson, the Court never decided what effect, if any, the Sev-
enteenth Amendment had on the issue. One of the few opinions to
construe the vacancy provision of the Seventeenth Amendment is
Valenti v. Rockefeller.' Valenti arose out of the assassination of
Senator Robert Kennedy. Since the assassination occurred less than
60 days prior to New York's spring primary, it was too late to sched-
ule a senatorial race. 10 New York law provided that the vacancy
would then be filled at the next general election held in an even
numbered year. 0 2 The election procedure resulted in a Senator, ap-
pointed temporarily by the Governor, serving for 29 months before
New York could hold a special election. 0 3
The Valenti court characterized the issue as whether the impor-
tance of a prompt special election outweighed the State's interest in
following its normal schedule of primary elections.'0 4 First, the court
focused on the Seventeenth Amendment's grant of power to state
95. Fortson, 385 U.S. at 234. Presumably, if a state elects to require popular election of
its governor, then the balloting would have to conform to the one person, one vote standard.
96. Id. at 234.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 233-34. (The provision had been in the Georgia Constitution since 1824.)
99. Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231, 234 n.2 (1966).
100. 292 F. Supp. 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), affid, 393 U.S. 405 (1969). The Valenti court
could not find another case construing the Seventeenth Amendment's vacancy provision. Id. at
862.
101. Id. at 853. Senator Kennedy was killed June 6, 1968.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Valenti, 292 F. Supp. at 855. The plaintiffs in Valenti were willing to have the
state committees of the parties select nominees in order to have a prompt election. Compare
Trinsey v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 766 F. Supp. 1338 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (where plain-
tiff considered the primary election to be of paramount importance).
97 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW FALL 1992
legislatures to regulate special elections. 10 5 It next examined how the
state legislatures interpreted the extent of that power. The result of
the survey showed that legislators have interpreted their power to be
quite broad. Among the 50 states, many different statutes were en-
acted after ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment. The court
also found that many states had changed their vacancy statutes to
suit their changing needs.106
The court then applied a rational basis test and found that the
State had three substantial interests furthered by the election stat-
ute. First, elections in even-numbered years included an election for
either President of the United States or Governor of New York.1
0 7
Thus, the New York legislature acted reasonably in assuming voter
turnout would be higher in those election years. Second, political
parties did not conduct fundraising in off-years. Senatorial candi-
dates would be hard-pressed to finance election campaigns with little
monetary support from their party. 10 8 Third, the expense and incon-
venience of holding a special election in an off-year offset any bene-
fits derived by the State.'0 9
C. Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party
The most authoritative case on the subject of the constitutional
requirements of special elections is Rodriguez v. Popular Demo-
cratic Party."' In Rodriguez, a member of the Puerto Rican House
of Representatives died."' Puerto Rico's Supreme Court held that
the vacancy statute permitted the Representative's political party to
select, by primary election, a representative to fill the vacant seat." 2
Only members of the political party could vote in the special primary
or be a candidate."1
3
On appeal, the United State Supreme Court adopted much of
105. Valenti, 292, F. Supp. at 855. The court felt that the last phrase of the Amend-
ment, "as the legislature may direct", was so clear and plain as to be dispositive of the issue.
106. The court surveyed the vacancy statutes of the 50 states and found that 20 states
provided that the vacancy be filled at the next biennial election with no specified period for
nomination. The second most popular option was the same as the first with an additional provi-
sion that there be a primary election. Over the 55 years following ratification a number of
states had changed or revised their statutes. Thus there has been no uniformity of interpreta-
tion of the Seventeenth Amendment's vacancy provision by the state legislatures. Id. at 868-
70.
107. Id. at 859.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 860.
110. 457 U.S. 1 (1982).
1ll. Id. at 3.
112. Id. at 4-5.
113. Id. at 4.
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the same line of reasoning as used in Valenti v. Rockefeller. The
Court noted that there is no "right to vote" contained in the Federal
Constitution."1 4 Citing Fortson v. Morris, the Court reaffirmed the
principle that the Federal Constitution does not dictate the method a
State must choose to select State officers." 5 The Court proceeded to
distinguish Classic's proposition that where a State chooses to elect
officers, a citizen has the right to participate in the election.' The
Court held that Puerto Rico does not restrict access to general elec-
tions and that the vacancy statute applied equally to all legislative
vacancies."
7
Applying a rational basis test, the Court found that the Puerto
Rico legislature "could reasonably conclude that appointment by the
previous incumbent's political party would more fairly reflect the will
of the voters than appointment by the Governor." 1 8 Other legiti-
mate advantages of appointment by a political party instead of elec-
tion included time and expense. Finally, the Court opined that while
appointment "may have some effect on the ability of . . . citizens to
elect . . . the effect is minimal, and like that in Valenti, it [the ef-
fect] does not fall disproportionately on any discrete group."" 9
V. Suggested Framework for Analysis
An incident leading to a special election is an infrequent occur-
rence. Disputes arising out of a special election are quite rare. As a
result, the courts have had few opportunities to analyze the constitu-
tional requirements of special elections. In the few decisions availa-
ble, the courts have treated special elections as a mere subset of gen-
eral elections. A better theoretical approach would be for the courts
to explicitly recognize that special elections are unique.
The current method of analyzing special elections requires the
state to enumerate the rationales for the challenged statute. The
state's arguments are generally focused on the need to hold a quick
election. In doing so, the state, in the end, is forced to justify the
114. Rodriguez, 457 U.S. at 9 (quoting Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162,
178 (1875) for the proposition that the states control the qualifications necessary to vote.)
115. Rodriguez, 457 U.S. at 9. (Rodriquez and Fortson are concerned with special elec-
tions of state officials. Valenti involved a federal official. The U.S. Supreme Court has not
specifically addressed special elections of federal officials.)
116. Id. at 10.
117. Id. at 12.
118. Rodriguez, 457 U.S. at 12. The Governor of Pennsylvania appointed Harris Wof-
ford, a Democrat, to fill the seat that John Heinz, a Republican, had held. See supra, note 4
and accompanying text.
119. Id.
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differences in procedure between general and special elections. There
should be no reason for the state to make that differentiation since
the two types of elections are fundamentally different.
Under the proposed analysis, the state would not need to justify
the differences in procedure. Instead, the burden of proof would be
on the plaintiff to show an infringement of an enumerated constitu-
tional right.120 If the plaintiff cannot show a violation, then the stat-
ute must be upheld.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in both Fortson and Rodriguez, has
shown an inclination to adopt this analysis. Both cases involved elec-
tion procedures that might not have been acceptable in a general
election. The Supreme Court held that in neither of those cases were
the plaintiff's rights violated. The Court used the unique characteris-
tics of special elections to justify its conclusion.
Applying the proposed rule to the facts in Trinsey shows that
the Court of Appeals came to the correct result for the wrong rea-
son. Trinsey did not allege a violation of an explicit constitutional
right. Instead, he alleged that his right to vote was denied because
primary elections were not held. To plead a valid cause of action, he
should have pleaded facts that showed the Pennsylvania statute vio-
lated the Seventeenth Amendment on its face.
VI. Conclusion
This Comment has examined the components of special elec-
tions required by the Federal Constitution. The Comment, while
searching for requirements, has discovered that legislative history,
from both the Constitutional Convention and the Congressional de-
bates on ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment, provides almost
no guidance whatsoever. It is also evident that court opinions dis-
cussing general elections are not very useful either. The only helpful
materials are the few cases on special elections themselves.
These cases have held that the legislature has wide discretion in
the regulation of special elections. The courts have permitted this
broad exercise of legislative authority because of the unique circum-
stances under which special elections are held. This Comment pro-
poses that the courts ought to establish a bright-line rule that limits
voter's rights to the enumerated guarantees of suffrage found in the
Constitution.
Jeffrey D. Mohler
120. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
